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Bridging the Divide: Measuring Party System Change and Classifying Party Systems

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Abstract

Party systems research has proceeded along two parallel lines of inquiry, one predominantly "qualitative" and the other "quantitative." This article attempts to bridge this divide in two ways. First, by showing that qualitative information can be valuable in the construction of quantitative measures. Second, by showing that the results from applying theoretically-sensitive measurement tools can be useful for qualitative classification. These analyses are performed using an original dataset of party system changes in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Keywords: Political Parties, Political Institutions, Party System Change, Attributes, Classifying Party Systems, Inter-Party Competition, Party System Stability, Qualitative Information, Quantitative Measures, Qualitative-Quantitative Divide, Social Science Methods, Index of Fluidity, Sub-Saharan Africa, Classification.

1. Introduction

Scholarly interest in party systems is motivated in part by a desire to better understand the inherent characteristics of party systems, but even more so by awareness that these characteristics can significantly impact on the functioning of political systems. Research has shown that the characteristics of party systems—or party system *attributes*—can affect government stability, political stability, fiscal irresponsibility, and legislative outputs, as well as numerous other governance outcomes (e.g., Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004; Mainwaring,

1993; Mainwaring and Scully, 1995).

While party system specialists, and political scientists in general, tend to agree that party system attributes are an important determinant of the functioning and ultimately survival of political systems, they disagree about how these attributes should be described, compared and analyzed. Qualitatively-oriented scholars (e.g., Sartori, 2005[1976]; Bogaards, 2004; Siaroff, 2003; Ware, 1996, 2009; Wolinetz, 2004) tend to believe that party system taxonomies based on qualitative criteria provide the most appropriate approach for mapping variation in party system attributes. Quantitative scholars are more sceptical of the utility of such classification schemes and the theories underpinning them, and prefer to analyze party system attributes using metrics devised to capture the fragmentation (Rae, 1967; Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), polarization (Dalton, 2008),and volatility (Pedersen, 1979; Bartolini and Mair, 1990) of party systems. This qualitative-quantitative divide is not an absolute one:researchers do draw from both traditions, and this was especially true in early party systems scholarship (e.g., Duverger, 1951; Blondel, 1968). Nonetheless, it remains broadly accurate to describe the literature as having developed along two parallel lines of inquiry, separated by methods and fundamental beliefs about how party systems are best understood.

This paper attempts to move beyond the traditional qualitative-quantitative divide by showing that when quantitative measures are conceived, devised and applied in ways that are sensitive to theoretical arguments in the qualitative scholarship, they can improve the basic taxonomic exercise of classifying party systems as types. In other words, theoretically-informed quantification can improve the rigor of qualitative empirical analysis. We develop this argument by using the recently developed index of party system fluidity (Nwokora and Pelizzo, 2015) to measure the extent of stability of patterns of party competition across Sub-Saharan Africa. The fluidity index, we show, enables a more precise classification of party systems in this region as “structured” or “fluid” (Sartori, 2005; Bogaards, 2004, 2008;

Erdmann and Basedau, 2008).

The remainder of the article is organized in five sections. The first section races the emergence of the qualitative-quantitative divide, highlighting two themes: the increasing reluctance of qualitative party system specialists to use quantitative metrics; and the often crudetreatment that quantitative measurement tools give to qualitative insights. Building on this discussion, we make the case for deeper integration of qualitative and quantitative research, arguing that qualitative insights can enable quantitative scholars to construct better measures and that such measures can be usefully employed in qualitative analysis. Our demonstration of this argument centers on the classification of party systems, which has been an important agenda within the qualitative scholarship.

The second section shows that scholars who apply Sartori's typology—still the most widely used schema (see e.g., Wolinetz, 2004; 2006)—sometimes reach different conclusions about the classification of particular cases. In some cases, an apparent disagreement may be due to a basic misclassification, if a real-world system is classified as a type even though it clearly lacks the essential attributes of that type. In other cases, however, the disagreement may be more subtle and depend on judgments about the extent to which a type exhibits a property. In these more difficult situations, a properly crafted quantitative measure, which is consistent with the logic of the qualitative theory, can be used to resolve disagreements. We use the recently developed index of party system fluidity to demonstrate this argument. Given its newness to the literature, we discuss the index and some of its properties in the paper's third section. Then, in the fourth section, we show how it can be used to harmonize three prominent classifications of African party systems (Bogaards,2004;2008; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008). The final section summarizes the preceding analyses.

2. Emergence of the Qualitative-Quantitative Divide

To explore the emergence of the qualitative-quantitative divide in party systems research, it is useful to have in mind a clear definition of the terms "qualitative" and "quantitative." These terms are widely used in social-science research, but not always consistently. For our purposes, we draw on the influential scales-of-measurement theory, proposed initially by the psychologist S.S. Stevens (see Jacoby, 1999), to define these terms. This theory distinguishes four levels at which entities can be compared. At the nominal level, entities are divided into classes based on their observable properties or some underlying theoretical criteria. It has been common to restrict the use of the term "qualitative" to comparisons that operate at this level, and this is the approach we follow in this paper. The nominal level can be contrasted against ordinal, interval and ratio levels of measurement, all of which are usually considered "quantitative."[1]

The development of classification schemes to identify and compare distinct types of party systems has long been central to the qualitative research agenda on party systems (e.g., Blondel, 1968; Duverger, 1951; La Palombara and Weiner, 1966; Macridis, 1967; Rokkan, 1968). The types in a typology operate at the nominal level so, strictly speaking, there is no numerical relationship between them. However, early scholars of party systems used the quantitative information that was available at that time—namely, the number of parties and their relative electoral strength—for classification purposes (see especially Wolinetz 2006: 55-56). In this sense, their classification schemes crossed the standard qualitative-quantitative divide. Duverger (1951) categorized party systems on the basis of the number of parties and identified "one," "two" and "multiparty" systems. These categories were types, but the theoretical dimension used to derive them, the number of parties, is a ratio scale. Blondel

[1]An ordinal scale gives a rank-ordering of elements, but no indication of the extent of difference between them. An interval scale permits entities to have differences of degree, while a ratio scale adds to this a meaningful (i.e., non-arbitrary) zero value.

(1968) examined the share of votes won by the two largest parties and the distribution of support between the two major parties, and on this basis identified two-party systems, two-and-half-party systems, multiparty systems with a predominant party and multiparty systems without a predominant party. This schema nested qualitative and quantitative criteria. Like Duverger's typology, it distinguished between types using the number of parties, a quantitative dimension. Blondel went beyond Duverger, however, by differentiating various kinds of multiparty systems using qualitative criteria: the existence or absence of a minor ("half") party or a predominant party.[2]But these criteria were operationalized using quantitative data. The half-party in a two-party system existed when the share of the vote of the two largest parties exceeded 89 per cent, while a predominant party existed when the strongest party averaged 40 percent or more of the vote and twice as much as the second party.

In *Parties and Party Systems*, Sartori (2005[1976]) proposed what thereafter became the most influential party systems typology. He distinguished seven distinct types, but quantitative information was relevant to the theoretical specification of these types and their identification in the real world. The number of "relevant" parties—that is, parties with coalitional or blackmail potential—is essential to Sartori's classification scheme. One-party, hegemonic-party, and predominant-party systems are characterized by the presence of a single relevant party, two-party systems are characterized by the presence of two relevant parties, moderate pluralist party systems have between three and five relevant parties, while polarized pluralist party systems have more than five parties because that is the level of fragmentation at which fragmentation exacerbates ideological polarization. Numbers feature prominently in Sartori's framework in a second respect: the determination of whether a

[2]For a detailed study of "half parties" in party systems, see Siaroff (2003).

system has one, two, between 3 and 5, or more than five relevant parties largely depends on the parties' electoral returns which are expressed in numerical form.

With the exception of a few recent studies (Mainwaring and Scully, 1995; Ware, 1996), the development of qualitative typologies using quantitative information has generally been abandoned by party system scholars. Party system taxonomists (Wolinetz, 2004: 9) explain this change by saying that with the development of sophisticated measures of party system attributes, quantitatively-inclined scholars lost interest in "tiresome exercises in taxonomy." New tools to measure attributes such as "fragmentation" and "polarization" were shown to be associated with far-reaching political and economic consequences, including government stability (Taylor and Herman, 1971), legislative stability (Pelizzo and Cooper, 2002), the stability of presidential regimes (Mainwaring, 1993), the quantity and quality of legislation (Tsebelis, 1999), and the prevalence of electoral cycles in fiscal policy (Alt, Dreyer and Lassen, 2006). Moreover, analyses using the new metrics could largely avoid the difficulties and uncertainties associated with classification since they required the analyst to count (in various ways) rather than identify differences of kind. A further criticism of the qualitative approach applied specifically to the influential Sartori typology. Scholars such as Peter Mair (1996) argued that due to party system changes since the 1970s—including the demise of authoritarianism, communism, and fascism in Europe and the weakening of traditional cleavage structures—there had been a convergence of party systems into the moderate pluralist category. This crowding of moderate pluralism, and the emptying out of other types, made classification on the basis of Sartori's typology less useful for understanding variation in the functioning of party systems. With quantitative metrics, however, it was possible to undertake finer-grained analyses of party systems within the bloated moderate pluralist category. In short, quantitative scholars believed that the new measures could make a greater contribution than once popular typologies.

Meanwhile, qualitatively-oriented scholars, who were at first doubtful ofthe merits of quantitative measures, became increasingly sceptical of them and keen to expose their limitations (see e.g., Mair, 1996; Ware, 1996, 2009; Wolinetz, 2004, 2006). This scepticism is echoed by Bogaards (2004: 174) who recently argued that "attempts to make inferences about the type of party system on the basis of indexes of party number are seriously flawed."Furthermore, Bogaards remarked, "The failure of mathematical indexes to identify party systems illustrates the tension that exists between the assumption of a continuum underlying mathematical measures of party number and 'jumps' that occur in real-life politics and are incorporated in discontinuous classification" (Bogaards, 2004:188).This critique of quantitative metrics has not been matched by innovations from qualitiative scholars to remedy these problems. There have been only a few attempts to develop new typologies that improve upon Sartori's. Crucially, none of these efforts has become popular in the way that Sartori's typology did, so this typology continues to dominate in qualitative research even though scholars are quick to point out its limitations.

On the other hand, qualitatively-oriented scholars have had little choice but to rely on quantitative metrics. This point is apparent in qualitative studies that aim to distinguish between "stable" and "unstable" party systems (e.g., Bogaards, 2004, 2008; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008). This qualitative distinction is important when applying Sartori's typology in emerging states, or "fluid polities, "because Sartori developed separate, and slightly different, classification schemes for systems that could be considered relatively stable and those that were unstable. Sartori also proposed a qualitiative indicator to distinguish between these two classes: the existence or absence of mass parties. But, as we discuss later, this can be a problematic indicator of stability. Therefore, scholars have usually turned to quantitative metrics of "volatility" to measure system stability. From a qualitative standpoint, this approach is less than ideal. It leaves unsettled the question of how to determine a suitable

cut-off point to separate stable and unstable party systems. Moreover, these metrics do not capture the stability of a party system, when this term is conceptualized in the Sartori sense to mean the pattern of competition—they tend to capture change in the electoral standing of parties in a party system, which can occur while a pattern of competition remains stable.

To summarize, the early scholarship on party systems made a serious effort to integrate quantitative and qualitative approaches. But since the 1970s, a division has arisen between (1) scholars who largely reject qualitative classification and (2) those who defend its value and continue to apply the Sartori typology, while noting its problems and despite having to use slightly problematic metrics to conduct their analyses. The development of these two perspectives—and, to some extent, the emergence of parallel literatures—stands in contrast to the early scholarship which embraced and mixed quantitative and qualitative perspectives. In our view, this qualitative-quantitative divide seems likely to have obstructed potential gains from cross-fertilizing quantitative rigour with qualitative insights. The remainder of this paper seeks to demonstrate the complementarity of these approaches. In particular, we aim to show that qualitative insights can facilitate better, more theoretically-rigorous measurement tools(Collier, La Porte and Seawright, 2012), and these measures can then be deployed by qualitative scholars in their classificatory efforts.

3. From a "System of Interactions" to a "Party System"

In an important passage in his book, Sartori noted that "parties make for a 'system', then, only when they are parts (in the plural); and a party system is precisely the *system of interactions* resulting from inter-party competition. That is the system in question bears on the relatedness of parties to each other, on how each party is a function (in the mathematical sense) of the other parties and reacts, competitively or otherwise, to other parties" (2005:39).

Thus, following the Sartori perspective, there is no doubt that a party system results from the pattern of inter-party competition. However, the existence of a pattern of inter-party competition does not in itself imply the existence of a party system. A party system exists only if the pattern of inter-party competition is stable over time. In other words, *stability* of the pattern of competition is necessary for "parties to make for a system."While stable patterns of interparty competition are party systems, unstable patterns of competition indicate a "fluid polity." As Sartori explains, "viscosity, resilience, and immobilizing impact of structures" (Sartori, 2005:217) are what distinguish patterns of inter-party competition in fluid polities from party systems proper.

While stability or fluidity is a discriminating factor, the pattern of competition—which is the basis of Sartori's "types"—is not. This is why Sartori (2005[1976]), and later Bogaards (2004, 2008) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008), could say that the patterns of competition in structured party systems were also detectable in fluid polities, and vice versa. The pattern of competition that gives rise to one-party and hegemonic-party systems in structured polities is the functional analogue of the dominant authoritarian pattern in fluid polities. The pattern associated with the predominant-party system in a structured party system finds its counterpart in the dominant non-authoritarian pattern in fluid polities. Two-party, moderate pluralist and polarized pluralist systems are the structured analogue of the non-dominant pattern in fluid polities, while the atomized system is the stable mirror image of the pulverized pattern in fluid polities.

The widespread application of these categories testified to, and indeed was responsible for, the success of Sartori's framework. These categories have been used to study party systems in all of the major geographical regions, though their best-known applications have been in studies of structured, and predominantly Western, party systems. In recent years, the framework has been used to classify party systems in Sub-Saharan Africa

(Bogaards, 2004; Bogaards, 2008; Erdmann and Basedau, 2008). The results of these three well-known classificatory efforts suggest there is some agreement but also some significant disagreement about how African party systems should be classified using Sartori's categories. Given that the framework is meant to capture the fundamental properties of party systems, such disagreement suggests uncertainty about the applicability of Sartori's framework or the characteristics of the party systems in question.

Table 1 presents data concerning the classification of 25 African party systems that were included either in Bogaards (2004) or in Bogaards (2008) and also in Erdmann and Basedau (2008). In his 2008 article, Bogaards classified 13 of the 18 party systems he had classified in his 2004 analysis. In 12 of the 13 cases, the 2008 classification was identical to the 2004 classification. The only exception is Zambia, which he classified as potentially dominant authoritarian in 2004 but as dominant in 2008.

Erdmann and Basedau (2008) used a larger sample than Bogaards (2004, 2008), but the cases analyzed in Bogaards (2004) and in Bogaards (2008) are also included in Erdmann and Basedau (2008). Comparison of these classifications reveals a mix of agreement and disagreement on particular cases. If we treat each country as an equivalent case, we can summarize by saying there are more disagreements than agreements. In fact, the Bogaards (2004) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) taxonomies yield identical classifications for only seven out of 18 countries (Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Madascar, Senegal, Zimbabwe).Comparing Bogaards (2008) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008), only five of the 20 party systems classified by Bogaards (Benin, Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal and Zimbabwe) are classified in the same way by Erdmann and Basedau.

[Table 1 here]

Crucially, the differences between these taxonomies has very little to do with how *systems of interaction* are classified. If one recalls that there is correspondence between fluid patterns and structured patterns—for example, the dominant-authoritarian pattern corresponds to the one-party/hegemonic-party pattern—then it is clear that Erdmann and Basedau (2008) classify 17 out of 18 systems of interactions in a similar way to Bogaards (2004), and 19 out of 20 systems of interaction in a similar way to Bogaards (2008). The only disagreements not of this kind concern Zambia, where there is not correspondence on the observed pattern of competition: in Bogaards (2004), the pattern is (probably) dominant authoritarian; in Bogaards 2008, the pattern is dominant; and in Erdmann and Basedau (2008), the pattern is non-dominant authoritarian. Hence, in nearly all cases, the disagreements among these classifications depend entirely on whether patterns of competition should be regarded as structured or fluid. These disagreements suggest, however, that determining whether a party system is "structured" or "fluid" is far from straightforward. In the section that follows, we review some alternative approaches to resolving this issue.

4. Structuration versus Fluidity

When Sartori conducted the analyses that were eventually presented in *Parties and Party Systems*(1976), many African countries had just become independent and the parties and party systems in the region had just been created. It was too early to assess whether these emergent patterns of competition would "consolidate" or "institutionalize," and therefore Sartori chose to regard such patterns as "fluid."Party system scholars have adopted, over the years, various indicators to assess the extent of such party system "institutionalization."

A Sartorian line of inquiry assesses the institutionalization of African party systems based on the presence/absence of mass parties (Bogaards, 2008: 178), building on Sartori's

(2005: 217) argument that "a party system becomes structured when it contains solidly entrenched mass parties." This approach assumes a strong connection between the existence of mass parties and the stability of the pattern of competition. In Africa, however, proper mass parties are rare, but there is clearly significant variation in the stability of party systems.

Some studies (Mozaffar et al. 2003; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Bogaards, 2008; Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014) employ Pedersen's index of volatility (Pedersen, 1979) to evaluate party system institutionalization in Africa. Pedersen's index computes the net change in parties' vote or seat totals between elections. This approach works on the assumption that high volatility indicates absence of consolidation. However, other studies, such as Bartolini and Mair (1990), challenge this claim. Disaggregating volatility into two basic types, they argue that while between-bloc volatility—the volatility caused by the vote-switching across cleavage lines—provides a proper indication of the extent of consolidation, within-bloc volatility—vote-switching between parties on the same side of a cleavage/issue—provides no such indication. More recently, Powell and Tucker (2014) decompose total volatility into "Type A" and "Type B" volatility, which indicate, respectively, vote-switching to new parties and vote-switching among existing parties. These measures are used by Weghorst and Bernhard (2014:1730) to argue that the steady decline in Type A volatility and the corresponding increase in Type B volatility provide "important evidence of the beginning of party system institutionalization," and suggest that "that party systems in sub-Saharan Africa are volatile but institutionalizing over time" (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014:1708).

Kuenzi and Lambright (2001) apply multiple criteria to assess institutionalization. They treat institutionalization as a function of acceptance/legitimacy of the electoral process and results, the stability of party rootedness in society, and the regularity of party competition. The legitimacy/acceptance of the electoral process is assessed on the basis of whether a major party boycotts elections, whether losers accept the electoral result, and

whether elections are free and fair. The stability of party roots is measured on the basis of parties' average age and the percentage of lower chamber seats held by parties created by 1970. Finally, they estimate the regularity of party competition by computing volatility in legislative elections, volatility of presidential elections and the difference between levels of volatility recorded in these two types of elections.

Erdmann and Basedau (2008) adopt a two-stage approach to categorize African party system. In the first stage, they use Sartori's typology for fluid polities to categorize patterns of competition in Africa as dominant, non-dominant and pulverized. In the second stage, they assess whether the patterns of competition previously identified should be regarded as "fluid" or "structured." A party system qualifies as "institutionalized" when there have been at least three consecutive elections, democracy has not been interrupted, seat volatility is no higher than 40 (according to Pedersen's index), and average party age is at least 15 years (or nearly as old as the democratic regime itself).

The approaches applied by Weghorst and Bernhard, Kuenzi and Lambright, and Erdmann and Basedau each amend the basic volatility index as developed by Pedersen. In the case of Weghorst and Bernhard, the measurement of volatility is amended, while Kuenzi and Lambright and Erdmann and Basedau bolster the measurement of volatility by tapping other party system dimensions. In each approach, however, the measurement strategy is centered on the volatility of the parties in the system, rather than the system itself. Furthermore, due to this plurality of approaches, party system scholars have reached different conclusions about whether particular party systems should be regarded as structured or fluid, and whether "African party systems" in general should be regarded as structured or fluid. The absence of mass parties and high levels of total volatility have led some scholars (Bogaards, 2008) to regard patterns of interparty competition in Africa as fluid, while declining rates of Type A volatility and the regularity/legitimacy of interparty competition have led other scholars to

consider at least some African party systems as increasingly if not properly institutionalized (Weghorst and Bernhard, 2014).

We suggest a new approach for estimating the extent to which patterns of competition are fluid or structured in this region, which aims to measure directly the stability of a party *system*, rather than the volatility of the parties that make up that system. Like Erdmann and Basedau (2008), we apply a two-stage approach. Using Sartori's counting rules and party system types, we collected electoral data for 49 African polities from their first elections (or the first since WWII) until and including their 2012elections in order to assess whether patterns of interaction corresponded to the properties of one-party, hegemonic-party, predominant-party, two-party, moderate pluralist, polarized pluralist and atomized party systems. (See Appendix). We believe this method is preferable to Erdmann and Basedau's treatment of patterns of competition as dominant, non-dominant and pulverized, for two reasons.

First, our approach avoids the risk of putting together systems that differ in significant respects. The dominant category used by Erdmann and Basedau (2008) could apply to the fluid analogue of the predominant-party system if consistent with democratic practice, but also to the fluid analogue of the one-party and hegemonic-party systems when coupled with authoritarian tendencies. However, the distinction between *democratic* dominance and *autocratic* dominance is theoretically and practically important. Similarly, the fact that a system of interaction has two relevant parties makes it quite different from a system with a larger number of relevant parties, though both might be considered "non-dominant." Our decision to use Sartori's principal types prevents the conflation of such different patterns. Second, our approach enables a more empirically-sensitive classification. Because Erdmann and Basedau (2008) use only three categories to classify patterns of competition, they can only detect changes among these categories. Using seven categories we can detect not only

the changes that Erdmann and Basedau detect, but also changes that occur among those patterns of competition that are lumped together in Erdmann and Basedau's (2008) classification.

Having categorized patterns of competition, we then proceed in the second stage to detect whether change in the pattern of interparty competition has occurred within a country. In doing so, we track not only whether a system change has occurred but also the magnitude of change. Any change in pattern of competition indicates some degree of instability in a country's party system, but some changes are more destabilizing than others. Change from a one-party system to a hegemonic-party system or from polarized pluralism to atomization—which are contiguous categories—is less transformative than change from a one-party system to an atomized system. Change from a one-party system to a hegemonic-party system implies change in the mechanism by which the relevant party secures its relevance, but the number of relevant parties in the system remains unchanged. Similarly, in a change from polarized pluralism to atomization, a system that already has a high number of relevant parties becomes a system with an even higher number of parties. Butif a change occurs between the one-party and atomized systems we witness change from a system of maximum power concentration to a system where power is so dispersed that it is almost no longer a system.

Once this information is collected, we follow Nwokora and Pelizzo (2015) by calculating the magnitude of party system change along three distinct dimensions. One pertains to the frequency of change; one pertains to the scope or extent or change; while the third concerns the variety of change, that is, the number of distinct patterns that a party system goes through in its historical development. Each dimension is relevant for understanding the dynamics of party systems. Furthermore, they do not necessarily correlate, which means that a party system can be stable in one sense while being unstable in another. An example would be a system that undergoes regular changes between the same two types.

Such a party system would have a high frequency of change, but a low variety of change. If the changes occurred between two types with reasonably similar mechanical properties—for example, the predominant and two-party types—then the scope of change would also be low. We could conclude, in a party system with this dynamic pattern, that the predominant party fails to consolidate its predominance over time or the two-party system is unable to ensure regular alternation of parties in office.

The frequency of party system change is measured by dividing the number of changes in the pattern of competition by the number of elections (since independence and up to and including 2012). The scope or extent of change is calculated on the basis of an ordinal scale with seven points spanning from "one-party system" to "atomized system."To calculate the variety of change, we observe the number of different types that are observed in a country during a historical period. The scores for each sub-dimension are multiplied to produce an "index of fluidity" score. Let us consider an example to see how this score can be computed. The Seychelles experienced three party system changes in the period from 1970 until 2012: from a two-party system (1970-1979) to a one-party system (1979-1993); from a one-party system to a predominant-party system (1993-2011); and from a predominant-party system to a two-party system (2011 onwards). These three transitions occurred over the course of 10 elections, giving a frequency of 0.3. The scope of change, from a two-party system to a one-party system, equals three. The variety of change also equals three. The total fluidity score in this case is therefore 2.7, which is comparatively low for the region (see Appendix).

5. From Measurement to Classification

The index yields quantitative measures, but it requires input of qualitative data, which relies on knowledge of the relevant countries' elections, parties and party systems. Thus, the

index's computation necessitates some bridging of the qualitative-quantitative divide. The qualitative-quantitative divide is also overcome in a second way: the index can improve the precision of qualitiative classification. Specifically, the index of fluidity provides analysts with the information necessary to determine whether patterns of competition are fluid or structured. As we discussed earlier, the disputed classifications in prominent taxonomies of African party systems turn on the answer to this question.

Our computations reveal that African party systems display highly variable levels of fluidity (see Table 2 and Appendix). In countries such as Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, Djibuti, The Gambia and Zimbabwe, patterns of interparty competition are highly stable. The party systems of these countries can be properly regarded as "stable" or "structured."At the other extreme, the data reveal that patterns of competition in Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal and Mauritania have been rather unstable, which sustains the claim that these are fluid party systems. As a preliminary test of the validity of the index (in the African context), we correlate the 2012 estimates against countries' 2008 fluidity scores. This test reveals a very strong, positive and statistically correlation between these estimates (r = .949, sig. = .000), which indicates that the measure yields estimates that are stable over time. This suggests that the index is a reliable tool. Moreover, it suggests that the party systems identified by the index as being relativley stable are likely to remain so (at least in the short run), while unstable party systems will tend to continue to display unstable properties.

We also correlated these fluidity scores against several measures that might be expected to be empirically associated with party system stability, namely Kuenzi and Lambright's index of institutionalization, Basedau and Stroh's index of institutionalization (Basedau and Stroh, 2008), and the World Governance Indicators' measure of political stability (Kaufmann et al., 2014) in 2012.The correlation between fluidity in 2012 and the level of institutionalization as measured by Kuenzi and Lambright in 2001 is negative, but

modest and not statistically significant (r = -.222, sig. = .238). The correlation between fluidity and Basedau and Stroh's measure of institutionalization yields a moderately strong, negative, but statistically insignificant coefficient (r = -.351, sig. = .355).Unsurprisingly, correlating 2008 fluidity scores instead of 2012 scores yields similar findings.[3]Overall, these results suggest that higher levels of party system institutionalization are associated with higher levels of party system stability and lower levels of institutionalization are associated with higher levels of fluidity, but these connections are not highly reliable. In the case of the correlation between the fluidity index and Basedau and Stroh's measure, estimates of the consistency of the relationship are also likely to be undermined by the small number (9) of cases. Finally, the correlation between the index of fluidity and the measure of political stability yields a moderately strong, negative and statistically significant cofficient (r = -.315, sig. = .029), which confirms the widespread suspicion that unstable party systems are associated with politically-motivated violence and unrest. Interestingly, the correlation between fluidity 2008 scores and the political stability index is also statistically significant, though the strength of this correlation is weaker than for the 2012 fluidity estimates (r = -.290, sig. = .045). This finding has an important practical implication: it suggests that fluidity might have potential as a prognostic tool for estimating political risk; its utility in this capacity diminishes the further into the future the projection is made.

[Table 2 here]

In addition to being a valid and reliable measure of party system dynamics, the index of fluidity can also be employed to categorize party systems. As noted above, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) classified seven party systems (Benin, Kenya, Lesotho, Mali, Madagascar, Senegal, Zimbabwe) in exactly the same way as Bogaards (2004), with both studies agreeing

[3] Correlating the 2008 fluidity scores to Basedau and Stroh's index produces a coefficient of r = -1.09, sig. =.780; correlating these fluidity scores to Kuenzi and Lambright's index produces a coefficient of r = -.236, sig. = .209.

these patterns of inter-party competition are unstable. The fluidity index scores for 2012, presented in Table 2, largely sustain this claim. In Madagascar, Mali and Senegal, the pattern of interparty competition has been highly unstable and these systems should therefore be regarded as fluid. These countries post fluidity index scores that are among the highest in the sample. However, computing the fluidity index for Benin suggests a party system that may be more stable than has been conventionally recognized. It posts a fluidity score of 3, which is comparatively low for the region, but was regarded by Bogaards (2004) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) as unstable. Table 2 also shows that if the stability of competition is measured autonomously (on the basis of electoral returns alone), as the fluidity index aims to do, rather than heteronomously (on the basis of, for instance, political violence), both Kenya and Zimbabwe should be regarded as structured party systems. A similar observation might also be made of Lesotho, which posts a "borderline" fluidity index score.

11 out of the 18 cases that appear in Bogaards (2004) and Erdmann and Basedau (2008) are classified differently. In most cases—the exception is Zambia—disagreement consisted in the fact that while Bogaards (2004) regarded all the systems of interaction as fluid, Erdmann and Basedau (2008) considered them structured. Looking at the data presented in Table 2, we see that Erdmann and Basedau's assessment is supported by the 2012 fluidity scores in half of the cases (5 out of 10). In Botswana, Cameroon, Gabon, Mauritius, Namibia, patterns of competition display relatively little or no fluidity. Therefore, Erdmann and Basedau are quite correct to regard these systems as structured. On the other hand, the patterns of competition observed in Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Mauritania, and Sao Tome and Principe accord more closely with Bogaards's classification of them as highly fluid. In the case of the Zambian party system, the disagreement between these classifications depends on whether that system should be regarded as a dominant or a non-dominant authoritarian system, but both studies agree on the fact that the pattern of

competition should be treated as fluid. The fluidity index scores provide only weak support for this contention, with Zambia posting a fluidity score similar to the borderline score of Lesotho.

Comparing Bogaards (2008) toErdmann and Basedau (2008), there are five agreed on cases (Benin, Lesotho, Malawi, Senegal and Zimbabwe). The 2012 fluidity index scores sustain the classification of two of these cases (Malawi and Senegal), both of which post relatively high scores and are classified as being highly unstable in Erdmann and Basedau (2008) and in Bogaards (2008).However, the fluidity data casts some doubt on the classification of three cases. As noted earlier (in the comparison of Erdmann and Basedau (2008) to Bogaards (2004)), the index suggests that the classification of Benin, Lesotho and Zimbabwe as unstable systems is questionable. Of the 15 cases where these classifications disagree, only one of these disagreements (Zambia) does not turn on the question of whether the party system is fluid or not. Of the remaining 14, the index scores again support the two classification schemes in a roughly even number of cases. The index sustains the Erdmann and Basedau categorization in seven cases (Botswana, the Gambia, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa); but offers more support for Bogaards's classifications in six cases (Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Ghana, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe). The party system of Djibuti posts an index score similar to that of Lesotho and Zambia, and therefore might be reasonably described as "stable" or "unstable."

6. Conclusions

We have argued that our knowledge about party systems would improve more rapidly if, in instead of reinforcing the qualitative-quantitative methodological divide, qualitative and

quantitative party system scholars found ways to influence each other's analyses. Quantitatively-oriented party system scholars could benefit from the input of qualitatively-oriented scholars especially when refining quantitative tools. On the other hand, qualitatively-oriented party system scholars could also benefit from using properly crafted and well-informed quantitative measures and indexes for their taxonomic purposes.

In this paper we presented a theory-based, qualitatively-informed measure of party system change and have tried to show how it can improve party system classification. This is because the index of fluidity can enable party system scholars to establish whether a pattern of competition is largely structured or fluid. It is not an alternative to classification, we argue, but an effective tool to make classification more rigorous. The qualitative-quantitative methodological divide is a relatively recent development. The originators of party system research (Duverger, Sartori, Rokkan) applied qualitative and quantitative information to analyze party systems. In this paper, we have also argued that such integration can produce better scholarship than either numbers-aversion or numbers-obsession.

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Table 1. Classifying Africa's Party Systems

Country	Bogaards 2004	Bogaards 2008	Erdmann & Basedau 2008
Benin	Pulverized	Pulverized	Pulverised
Botswana	Dominant	Dominant	Predominant
Burkina Faso	Dominant authoritarian	Dominant authoritarian	Hegemonic
Cameroon	Dominant authoritarian		Hegemonic
Cape Verde	Non dominant	Non dominant	Two Party
Djibouti		Dominant authoritarian	Hegemonic
Equatorial Guinea		Dominant authoritarian	Hegemonic
Gabon	Dominant authoritarian		Hegemonic
Gambia, The		Dominant	Dominant authoritarian
Ghana	Non dominant	Non dominant	Two party
Kenya	Non dominant		Non-dominant
Lesotho	Dominant	Dominant	Dominant
Malawi		Non dominant	Non dominant
Mali	Non dominant		Non dominant
Madagascar	Non dominant		Non dominant
Mauritania	Dominant authoritarian	Dominant authoritarian	Hegemonic
Mauritius	Non dominant	Non dominant	Moderate pluralism
Mozambique		Dominant	Predominant
Namibia	Dominant	Dominant	Predominant
Sao Tome and Principe	Non dominant	Non dominant	Moderate pluralism
Senegal	Non dominant	Non dominant	Non dominant
Seychelles		Dominant	Predominant
South Africa		Dominant	Predominant
Zambia	Dominant authoritarian?	Dominant	Non-dominant authoritarian
Zimbabwe	Dominant authoritarian	Dominant authoritarian	Dominant authoritarian

Table 2. Fluidity in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country	Fluidity in 2012	Fluidity in 2008
Angola	3.60	4.50
Benin	3.00	2.25
Botswana	0.20	0.22
Burkina Faso	6.86	8.00
Cameroon	3.60	4.00
Cape Verde	6.00	6.86
Djibuti	4.29	4.00
Equatorial Guinea	12.00	14.40
Gabon	1.33	1.50
Gambia, The	0.66	0.73
Ghana	6.00	6.00
Kenya	2.40	2.40
Lesotho	4.50	1.71
Liberia	2.45	2.70
Madagascar	6.00	6.86
Malawi	6.67	5.82
Mali	8.88	8.88
Mauritania	12.00	8.89
Mauritius	2.25	2.45
Mozambique	0.67	0.80
Namibia	0.00	0.00
Sao Tome and Principe	8.00	6.86
Senegal	10.00	8.89
Seychelles	2.70	2.00
South Africa	0.00	0.00
Zambia	4.36	1.20
Zimbabwe	1.00	0.80

Fluidity in Sub-Saharan Africa

Country (Electoral Regimes)	Year of Election	Type of Party System	Frequency		Scope	Variety	Frequency* Scope*Variety	Fluidity Index Score
			Number of Elections	Number of Type Changes	Distance between Most Different Types	Number of Different Types		
Angola (1975-2012)	1980 1986 1992 2008 2012	One-Party One-Party Two-Party Hegemonic Hegemonic	5	2	3	3	(2/5)*3*3	3.60
Benin (1960-61; 1964-65; 1968-69; 1970-72; 1991-2012)	1960 1964 1968 1970 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011	Two-Party Hegemonic Hegemonic Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Two-Party	9	3	3	3	(3/9)*3*3	3.00
Botswana (1965-2012)	1965 1969 1974 1979 1984 1989 1994 1999 2004 2009	Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	10	1	1	2	(1/10)*1*2	0.20
Burkina Faso (1959-66; 1970-74; 1977-80; 1991-2012)	1959 1965 1978 1991 1998 2005 2010	Two-Party One-Party Mod. Pluralism Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic	7	3	4	4	(3/7)*4*4	6.86
Burundi (1962-66; 1979-96; 2005-12)	1961 1965 1984 1993 2010	Hegemonic Predominant One-Party Two-Party Hegemonic	5	4	3	4	(4/5)*3*4	9.60
Cameroon (1965-2012)	1965 1970 1975 1980 1984 1988 1992 1997 2004 2011	One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party Mod. Pluralism Hegemonic Hegemonic Hegemonic	10	3	4	3	(3/10)*4*3	3.60
Cape Verde (1975-2012)	1975 1980 1985 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011	One-Party One-Party One-Party Two-Party Hegemonic Two-Party Two-Party Two-Party	8	3	4	4	(3/8)*4*4	6.00
Central African Republic (1959-66; 1981-2003; 2005-12)	1959 1964 1981 1992 1993	Hegemonic One-Party Two-Party (Result annulled) Mod.	8	6	4	5	(6/8)*4*5	15.00

		Pluralism						
	1999	Predominant						
	2005	Mod. Pluralism						
	2011	Predominant						
Chad (1960-75; 1996-2012)	1962	One-Party	7	3	4	4	(3/7)*4*4	6.85
	1963	One-Party						
	1969	One-Party						
	1996	Mod. Pluralism						
	2001	Predominant						
	2006	Predominant						
	2011	Hegemonic						
Comoros (1978-99; 2002-12)	1978	Atomized	8	2	6	3	(2/8)*6*3	4.50
	1982	One-Party						
	1987	One-Party						
	1990	Mod. Pluralism						
	1996	Mod. Pluralism						
	2002	Mod. Pluralism						
	2006	Mod. Pluralism						
	2010	Mod. Pluralism						
Congo Brazzaville (1960-63; 1992-97; 2002-12)	1961	One-Party	4	2	4	3	(2/4)*4*3	6.00
	1992	Mod. Pluralism						
	2002	Hegemonic						
	2009	Hegemonic						
Congo Kinshasa (1960-97; 2006-12)	1960	Mod. Pluralism	7	3	4	3	(3/7)*4*3	5.14
	1965	Hegemonic						
	1970	One-Party						
	1977	One-Party						
	1984	One-Party						
	2006	Mod. Pluralism						
	2011	Mod. Pluralism						
Cote d'Ivoire (1960-99; 2000-12)	1960	One-Party	10	3	4	4	(3/10)*4*4	4.80
	1965	One-Party						
	1970	One-Party						
	1975	One-Party						
	1980	One-Party						
	1985	One-Party						
	1990	Hegemonic						
	1995	Hegemonic						
	2000	Two-Party						
	2010	Mod. Pluralism						
Djibouti (1977-2012)	1977	Hegemonic	7	5	2	3	(5/7)*2*3	4.29
	1981	One-Party						
	1987	One-Party						
	1993	Predominant						
	1999	Hegemonic						
	2005	One-Party						
	2011	Hegemonic						
Equatorial Guinea (1968-69; 1982-91; 1991-2012)	1968	Mod. Pluralism	6	3	6	4	(3/6)*6*4	12.00
	1983	Atomized						
	1989	One-Party						
	1996	Hegemonic						
	2002	Hegemonic						
	2009	Hegemonic						
Eritrea	(no elections)	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
Ethiopia (1955-74; 1987-2012)	1955	Atomized	10	2	6	3	(2/10)*6*3	3.60
	1961	Atomized						
	1965	Atomized						
	1969	Atomized						
	1973	Atomized						
	1987	One-Party						
	1995	Hegemonic						
	2000	Hegemonic						
	2005	Hegemonic						
	2010	Hegemonic						
Gabon (1961-2012)	1961	Hegemonic	9	2	2	3	(2/9)*2*3	1.33
	1967	Hegemonic						
	1973	One-Party						
	1979	One-Party						

	1986	One-Party						
	1993	Predominant						
	1996	Predominant						
	2005	Predominant						
	2009	Predominant						
Gambia (1960-94; 1996-2012)	1960	Atomized	12	1	4	2	(1/12)*4*2	0.66
	1962	Predominant						
	1966	Predominant						
	1972	Predominant						
	1977	Predominant						
	1982	Predominant						
	1987	Predominant						
	1992	Predominant						
	1996	Predominant						
	2001	Predominant						
	2006	Predominant						
	2011	Predominant						
Ghana (1960-66; 1979-81; 1992-2012)	1960	Hegemonic	8	3	4	4	(3/8)*4*4	6.00
	1965	One-Party						
	1979	Mod. Pluralism						
	1992	Two-Party						
	1996	Two-Party						
	2000	Two-Party						
	2004	Two-Party						
	2008	Two-Party						
Guinea (1957-84; 1993-2008; 2010-12)	1957	Predominant	9	4	4	4	(4/9)*4*4	7.11
	1961	One-Party						
	1968	One-Party						
	1974	One-Party						
	1982	One-Party						
	1993	Predominant						
	1998	Predominant						
	2003	Hegemonic						
	2010	Mod. Pluralism						
Guinea Bissau (1972-80; 1984-2003; 2005-12)	1972	One-Party	9	1	4	2	(1/9)*4*2	0.89
	1976	One-Party						
	1984	One-Party						
	1989	One-Party						
	1994	Mod. Pluralism						
	1999	Mod. Pluralism						
	2005	Mod. Pluralism						
	2009	Mod. Pluralism						
	2012	Mod. Pluralism						
Kenya (1963-91; 1992-2012)	1963	Predominant	10	2	4	3	(2/10)*4*3	2.40
	1969	One-Party						
	1974	One-Party						
	1979	One-Party						
	1983	One-Party						
	1988	One-Party						
	1992	Mod. Pluralism						
	1997	Mod. Pluralism						
	2002	Mod. Pluralism						
	2007	Mod. Pluralism						
Lesotho (1965-86; 1993-2012)	1965	Two-Party	8	3	3	4	(3/8)*3*4	4.50
	1970	Two-Party						
	1985	Hegemonic						
	1993	Hegemonic						
	1998	Predominant						
	2002	Predominant						
	2007	Predominant						
	2012	Mod. Pluralism						
Liberia (1951-80; 1984-90; 1997-2001; 2003-12)	1951	Hegemonic	11	3	3	3	(3/11)*3*3	2.45
	1955	Hegemonic						
	1959	Hegemonic						
	1963	Hegemonic						
	1967	Hegemonic						
	1971	Hegemonic						
	1975	Hegemonic						
	1985	Two-Party						
	1997	Hegemonic						

	2005 2011	Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism						
Madagascar (1965-2009)	1965 1972 1982 1989 1992 1996 2001 2006	Hegemonic Hegemonic One-Party One-Party Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Two-Party Two-Party	8	3	4	4	(3/8)*4*4	6.00
Malawi (1961-93; 1994-2012)	1961 1964 1971 1976 1978 1983 1987 1992 1994 1999 2004 2009	Hegemonic One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party Mod. Pluralism Two-Party Mod. Pluralism Two-Party	12	5	4	4	(5/12)*4*4	6.67
Mali (1957-76; 1979-2012)	1957 1959 1964 1979 1985 1992 1997 2002 2007	Predominant Predominant One-Party One-Party One-Party Mod. Pluralism Hegemonic Mod. Pluralism Predominant	9	5	4	4	(5/9)*4*4	8.88
Mauritania (1959-60; 1961-78; 1992-2005; 2007-08; 2009-12)	1959 1961 1966 1971 1976 1992 1997 2003 2007 2009	Hegemonic Hegemonic One-Party One-Party One-Party Predominant Hegemonic Predominant Mod. Pluralism Two-Party	10	6	4	5	(6/10)*4*5	12.00
Mauritius (1959-2012)	1959 1963 1967 1976 1982 1987 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010	Predominant Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism Predominant Predominant Predominant Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism	12	3	3	3	(3/12)*3*3	2.25
Mozambique (1977-90; 1994-2012)	1977 1986 1994 1999 2004 2009	One-Party One-Party Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	6	1	2	2	(1/6)*2*2	0.67
Namibia (1994-2012)	1994 1999 2004 2009	Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	4	0	0	1	(0/4)*0*1	0
Niger (1965-74; 1989-91; 1993-96; 1999-2010;	1965 1970 1989 1993	One-Party One-Party One-Party Mod.	8	1	4	2	(1/8)*4*2	1

2011-12)		Pluralism						
	1996	Mod. Pluralism						
	1999	Mod. Pluralism						
	2004	Mod. Pluralism						
	2011	Mod. Pluralism						
Nigeria (1959-66; 1979-83; 1998-2012)	1959	Mod. Pluralism	9	2	2	3	(2/9)*2*3	1.33
	1964	Mod. Pluralism						
	1979	Mod. Pluralism						
	1983	Mod. Pluralism						
	1993	Two-Party						
	1999	Predominant						
	2003	Predominant						
	2007	Predominant						
	2011	Predominant						
Rwanda (1965-73; 1978-91; 2003-12)	1965	One-Party	7	1	1	2	(1/7)*1*2	0.28
	1969	One-Party						
	1978	One-Party						
	1983	One-Party						
	1988	One-Party						
	2003	Hegemonic						
	2010	Hegemonic						
Sao Tomê (1975-90; 1991-2012)	1975	One-Party	8	4	4	4	(4/8)*4*4	8.00
	1980	One-Party						
	1985	One-Party						
	1991	Hegemonic						
	1996	Mod. Pluralism						
	2001	Two-Party						
	2006	Two-Party						
	2011	Mod. Pluralism						
Senegal (1963-63; 1966-74; 1978-2012)	1963	Hegemonic	10	5	4	5	(5/10)*4*5	10.00
	1968	One-Party						
	1973	One-Party						
	1978	Predominant						
	1983	Predominant						
	1988	Predominant						
	1993	Predominant						
	2000	Mod. Pluralism						
	2007	Two-Party						
	2012	Mod. Pluralism						
Seychelles (1970-77; 1979-91; 1999-2012)	1970	Two-Party	10	3	3	3	(3/10)*3*3	2.70
	1974	Two-Party						
	1979	One-Party						
	1984	One-Party						
	1989	One-Party						
	1993	Predominant						
	1996	Predominant						
	2001	Predominant						
	2006	Predominant						
	2011	Two-Party						
Sierra Leone (1957-67; 1971-91; 1996-97; 1998-2012)	1957	Two	10	8	4	4	(8/10)*4*4	12.80
	1962	Mod. Pluralism						
	1967	Mod. Pluralism						
	1973	Hegemonic						
	1977	Two-Party						
	1985	One-Party						
	1996	Mod. Pluralism						
	2002	Two-Party						
	2007	Mod. Pluralism						
	2012	Two-Party						
Somalia (1964-69; 1976-91)	1964	Two-Party	4	1	3	2	(1/4)*3*2	1.50
	1969	Two-Party						
	1979	One-Party						
	1984	One-Party						
Somaliland (1997-2012)	1997	Atomized	3	1	4	2	(1/3)*4*2	2.67
	2003	Mod. Pluralism						

	2010	Mod. Pluralism						
South Africa (1994-2012)	1994 1999 2004 2009	Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	4	0	0	1	(0/4)*0*1	0.00
South Sudan (2010-12)	2010	Hegemonic	1	0	0	1	(0/1)*0*1	0.00
Sudan (1953-58; 1965-85; 1993-2012)	1953 1958 1968 1971 1978 1983 1996 2000 2010	Two-Party Mod. Pluralism Mod. Pluralism One-Party One-Party One-Party Atomized Hegemonic Predominant	9	5	6	6	(5/9)*6*6	20.00
Swaziland (1964-2012)	1964 1967 1972 1978 1983 1987 1993 1998 2003 2008	Predominant Predominant Predominant Atomized Atomized Atomized Atomized Atomized Atomized Atomized	10	1	4	2	(1/10)*4*2	0.80
Tanzania (1962-2012)	1962 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010	Hegemonic One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	11	2	2	3	(2/11)*2*3	1.10
Togo (1961-61; 1963-67; 1979-91; 1993-2012)	1961 1963 1979 1986 1993 1998 2003 2005 2010	Hegemonic Hegemonic One-Party One-Party Hegemonic Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	9	3	2	3	(3/9)*2*3	2.00
Uganda (1961-66; 1980-80; 1989-2012)	1961 1962 1980 1989 1996 2001 2006 2011	Mod. Pluralism Two-Party Two-Party Atomized Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant	8	3	4	4	(3/8)*4*4	6.00
Zambia (1968-2012)	1968 1973 1978 1983 1988 1991 1996 2001 2006 2008 2011	Hegemonic One-Party One-Party One-Party One-Party Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant Predominant Mod. Pluralism	11	3	4	4	(3/11)*4*4	4.36
Zimbabwe (1980-2012)	1980 1985 1990 1996 2002 2008	Predominant Predominant Hegemonic Hegemonic Predominant Hegemonic	6	3	1	2	(3/6)*1*2	1.00